Ga Mantse Challenges Court Rulings Reinstating Rival to National House of Chiefs Register

50) Having outlined the relevant facts and applicable law, we now proceed
to determine the appeals based on the two sets of grounds presented in both
appeals. It is noteworthy that grounds A and B of the 1st Appellant’s appeal,
as well as grounds A-D of the 2nd Appellant’s appeal, are similar. They
assert that an appeal under section 59 (7), Act 759, was the exclusive
remedy for the Respondent. Consequently, the High Court had no
jurisdiction to exercise supervisory powers over the 1st Appellant. As the
preceding analysis has demonstrated, the grounds of appeal were founded
on a flawed understanding of the provisions of Act 759. Section 43 of Act
759 affirms the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over the Houses of
Chiefs. Section 59 (7) does not indicate that other remedies are excluded.
Given that judicial review can address a dispute under Act 759 completely
and effectively, there can be no justification for insisting on an appeal. The aforementioned grounds asserting the exclusivity of appeal as a remedy lack
merit and are thus dismissed.

51) Ground C of the 1st Appellants’ appeal and grounds E and I of the 2nd
Appellant’s grounds of appeal assert that the removal of the name of the Respondent was an administrative act which was not amenable to the prerogative writ of mandamus. The definition of mandamus cited above from Black’s Law Dictionary, along with the Ghanaian decided cases cited, demonstrates that mandamus lies against the administrative decisions of a governmental officer or body, a body charged with public duty, or the State or its servants. We demonstrated (supra) that the 1st Appellant is a quasi-public body, whose staff are appointed by the President under the Constitution of Ghana, whose expenses are paid by the public through the Consolidated Fund, and whose accounts are audited by the Auditor-General. As a body charged with a public duty, the High Court has jurisdiction to review its administrative decisions judicially through the writ of mandamus. The grounds of appeal from the two appeals fail.

52) Ground D of the 1st Appellant’s grounds of appeal and ground F of the grounds of appeal of the 2nd Appellant faulted the decision of the High Court
for nullifying the removal of the Respondent’s name from the National Register when the removal was based on the fact that the question of who was the Ga Mantse was yet to be resolved.

After being nominated, vetted, and installed by his Traditional Council, the
Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs forwarded the name of the Respondent to the National House, which also reviewed the process of his installation before approving him for gazetting in the Chieftaincy Bulletin, and his name was entered onto the National Register of Chiefs. The only means by which his name could be removed from the National Register was death, abdication, destoolment, or by order of a court or Judicial Committee of a House of Chiefs. The Respondent’s name was removed without fulfilment of any of the pre-conditions.

If the National House of Chiefs cannot respect its processes, leading to
gazettement and the entry of a chief’s name onto its Register, can it expect
others to adhere to that process?

If all an opposing candidate can do to remove a gazetted chief’s name from the National Register of Chiefs is allege that there are pending petitions or questions concerning the ascension to that throne, whose name will remain on the National Register? If the Appellants’ argument is accepted, all a losing candidate needs to do to remove a gazetted chief’s name from the Register is file a petition or orchestrate some media publications, and presto! The name would be expunged. The Appellants, particularly the 1st Appellant, who must instil sanity and order in the Chieftaincy institution, are, by that argument, advocating chaos and confusion.

53) Ground E of the 1st Appellant and ground H of the 2nd Appellant assert
that the trial court failed to adhere to binding precedent. The primary precedent they relied upon was Ex parte Gyan IX, decided under section 50(7) of the repealed Act 370. It has been demonstrated that the Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the current Act 759 and Act 370, in cases such as Ex parte Ebusuapanin Kojo Yamoah and Ex parte Faibil III, and the Garbrah case, has explicitly held that mandamus is an appropriate order to issue for enforcing the registration of a chief’s name in the National Register.

In light of the current authority on the law, we cannot accept that the trial
court was bound to apply an earlier decision based on a repealed Act. The
grounds of appeal presented by both Appellants are dismissed.

54) Ground F of the 1st Appellant’s grounds of appeal and Ground G of the 2nd Appellant’s grounds faulted the trial judge for holding that the removal of the Respondent’s name violated his administrative justice rights, as entrenched in Article 23 of the Constitution. Article 23 rights to fairness and reasonableness are implied in every piece of legislation, including Act 759. To maintain that the removal of a chief’s name from the National Register without any court order— and worse still, without notifying him— advocates dictatorship, which contradicts the ethos of our constitutional order founded on due process. As established above, this removal, which violated Act 759 and precedent, namely Ex parte Faibil III and Ex parte Ebusuapanin Kojo Yamoah, etc., and adversely affected the accrued rights of the Respondent, violated Article 23 of the Constitution and rendered section 59 (7) of Act 759 impotent and inapplicable. The two grounds from the Appellants’ camps fail.

55) Ground G of the 1st Appellant’s grounds and J of the 2nd Appellant
assert that the appealed ruling is against the weight of evidence. Having (a)
established that there is duality of remedies in the form of the High Court’s
supervisory jurisdiction under section 43 of Act 759 and the right of appeal under section 59 (7), Act 759, (b) the High Court, by virtue of its supervisory
powers, had jurisdiction to determine the application, (c) the removal of the
name of the Respondent without notice to him, and in the absence of death, abdication, destoolment, or an order of an adjudicating body, was unfair and unreasonable, resulting in the violation of the Respondent’s administrative
justice rights under Article 23 of the Constitution, the ruling of the High Court conformed to, and swam comfortably with, the tide of the affidavit evidence. The two grounds of appeal, which themselves ran counter to the weight of the evidence, are dismissed.

APPEAL AGAINST COSTS

56) Ground H of the grounds of appeal from the 1st Appellant argues that
the costs of GH¢25,000.00 awarded against it are excessive.

The order awarding costs is found on page 150 of the ROA. Counsel for the
1st Appellant failed to address that ground of appeal, which is deemed
abandoned and struck out.

57) We found no merit in the appeal of the 1st Appellant filed on 18 November 2021, and that of the 2nd Appellant filed on 15 November 2021. Both appeals are dismissed. The ruling of the High Court, Kumasi, granting the Respondent’s application for mandamus, and ordering the 1st Appellant to restore the name of the Respondent onto the National Register of Chiefs, is hereby upheld.

The 1st Appellant is hereby ordered to restore the name of the Respondent onto the National Register of Chiefs as the Ga Mantse, within fourteen (14) days from today.

COSTS